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Agricultural policies adopted by developed countries are considered distortional and 
detrimental to less developed countries (LDCs). This paper discusses the adverse impacts on less 
developed countries of the agricultural support regimes of the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (US). Despite the fact that the budget for agriculture in these constituencies has the 
same order of magnitude, we find that the EU relies much more heavily on agricultural support 
than does the US. Specifically, the EU provides agricultural producers with an amount of support 
that is about two-and-a-half times that of the US, and for most commodities a larger share of 
farmers’ income stems from support measures as well. While the composition of producer 
support differs between the EU and US, the per-dollar negative impact of the policies on farmers 
in LDCs is about equal. Finally, we analyse the medium-term impact of the 2003 reform of 
common agricultural policy in the EU. We estimate the reform will lead to a reduction of EU 
producer support of 20 percent by 2013 and will reduce the per-dollar negative impact on LDCs 
of the policy as well. 
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Challenges for Less Developed Countries: Agricultural Policies in 
the EU and the US 
1. Introduction 
Agriculture is the make-it-or-break-it issue in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Doha Round of negotiations, with the impasse on reforming agricultural support programs 
central to the potential collapse of trade negotiations (Newfarmer 2006). A trade agreement that 
limits agricultural support programs in developed countries is important for facilitating free 
trade, but also to the economic development of less developed countries (LDCs).
1 The purpose 
of this paper is to investigate the impact on LDCs of agricultural support programs by develope
countries. 
d 
                                                
We will limit our analysis to the agricultural support programs of the European Union 
(EU) and the United States (US). Both constituencies have very sizable support programs with 
roughly similar budgets. In 2004 the budget of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
amounted to €46.8 billion (European Communities, 2004), while the budget of the US 
Department of Agriculture was $77.7 billion. However, there are a variety of different 
agricultural support measures and these may have very different implications. Also, agricultural 
support may go beyond budget lines. For example, market price support, a popular support 
measure, is often instituted through imposing import tariffs. Such tariffs protect local producers 
but they have no significant budget implications for governments.  
In this paper we focus on producer support programs as these have the strongest potential 
impact on production incentives. Production incentives, in turn, affect production levels in the 
EU and the US and hence also affect LDCs through world market prices and traded quantities of 
 
1 The United Nations draw a distinction between developing countries and least-developed countries. In 
this paper we use the acronym LDC to represent a country of one of these sets. 
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agricultural commodities. We will show that producer support in these constituencies differs 
substantially, despite the fact that the EU and US budgets on agriculture are of roughly the same 
magnitude. The OECD data we employ shows that producer support in the EU-25 in 2004 
amounted to €110 billion, while producer support in the US came down to $43 billion, i.e. 
roughly forty percent the EU amount. The data also shows that the proportion of farm receipts 
accounted for by producer support was about twice as high in the EU as in the US. However, 
with a few exceptions (eggs producers in the EU and the US, and meat producers in the US), 
producer support accounts for a fifth or more of farmers’ income in both constituencies. 
Not all forms of producer support distort production incentives to the same degree. We 
present diagrams to explain the distortional effects of the various components of producer 
support. We use this analysis to decompose producer support in the EU and the US according to 
the implied harm on LDCs. We find that in 2005 about a half of the producer support in both the 
EU and the US was of the most damaging type for LDCs. The US was a little worse than the EU 
in this respect, however the percentage of “somewhat harmful” support measures there was 
lower than that of the EU. In terms of composition, therefore, producer support in the EU and the 
US were roughly equally harmful to LDCs. In 2005 the (negative) footprint of the EU 
agricultural policy was still larger than that of the US, but this had to do with the magnitude of 
producer support, not its composition. 
In 2003 the common agricultural policy in the EU underwent an important reform. The 
‘Single Farm Payment’, a subsidy decoupled from agricultural production levels (or input use) 
was introduced, and EU member states also agreed to lower the expenses for direct producer 
support by 3 percent of the CAP budget annually and earmark the funds freed up for “rural 
development” (this was termed “modulation”). We study the medium-term impact of this reform 
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and find that it will reduce the level of support by 20 percent and imply a mix of support 
measures which is less harmful to producers in LDCs. However, in 2013 the CAP will still have 
a very negative impact on LDCs absent further reforms. The most substantial reduction of 
harmful support can be realized by reducing price support in the beef, pig meat, poultry and 
sheep meat markets. 
Our findings suggest that protectionist agricultural policies in both jurisdictions have a 
significant adverse impact on LDCs, and that the damage done by the EU is greater than by US. 
We conclude therefore that agricultural support programs do need to be addressed again in future 
multilateral trade negotiations if developed countries are serious about the well being of those 
that are less well off. However, forces to reform will face fierce opposition from local 
agricultural producers, particularly in the EU. A greater proportion of the EU workforce is 
employed in agriculture than the US. This might also (partially) explain the currently higher 
level of agricultural support in the EU, as more voters there have a stake in agriculture.  
We proceed as follows. Sections 2 and 3 further motivate our paper. In Section 2 we 
illustrate the importance of agriculture in developed and LDCs by examining the role of 
agriculture in employment and trade. In section 3, we present evidence on 30 least-developed 
countries that illustrates the crucial dependence of these countries on agricultural exports, 
generally, and often on just a handful of commodities. In section 4 we summarize the data on 
producer support in the  EU and the US. Our core arguments are provided in Sections 5 and 6. In 
Section 5 we first explain graphically how different support measures affect LDCs and 
afterwards decompose producer support in the EU and the US in terms of the implied harm on 
producers in LDCs. In Section 6 we review the empirical evidence regarding the damage of 
agricultural policies in rich countries on LDCs and analyse the anticipated consequences of the 
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2003 CAP reform in the EU. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Agriculture: What is the Big Deal? 
The Role of Agriculture in the Labor Force 
As an economic activity, agriculture is everywhere in secular decline relative to other 
sectors. Less than fifty years ago, over 60% of the world’s entire labor force was devoted to 
agriculture. Only in the last twenty years has agriculture accounted for less than half of the 
global workforce, with some two-fifths of the global work force employed in agriculture today. 
Yet, in absolute terms the number of agricultural workers has risen steadily, from 850 million to 
1.347 billion over the period 1961-2004 (World Resources Institute 2007). This is misleading, 
however, as agricultural workforce figures for LDCs generally include all rural laborers rather 
than only those engaged in agriculture. 
When distinguishing between developed countries and LDCs, we find that the absolute 
agricultural/rural workforce is shrinking in developed countries, but expanding in LDCs. From 
1992 to 2004, the agricultural labor force fell by 28% in developed countries, from 60 million to 
44 million, while the rural workforce in LDCs expanded by 12%, from 1.1 billion to slightly 
more than 1.3 billion workers. Clearly, a significant number of people directly rely on agriculture 
for their livelihood, a vast proportion of which are in LDCs. 
The share of the workforce employed in the agricultural sector is also significantly higher 
in LDCs than in rich countries (Figure 1). In 1961, 76% of workers in LDCs were employed in 
agricultural areas compared to 23% of workers employed in agriculture in developed countries. 
Nearly fifty years later, the difference persists: In 2004, agricultural regions employed 53% of 
workers in LDCs, but agriculture employed only 6% of workers in developed countries. 
 














































































































Figure 1: Developed & LDCs’ Agricultural/Rural Labor Force as a Percent of Total 












































































































Figure 2: Agricultural Labor Force as a Percent of Total: Europe, Canada and the United 
States (Source: World Resources Institute 2007) 
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While both the EU and the US experienced a decline in the share of agricultural workers 
in the labor force, agriculture employs more of the EU’s workforce than in the US (Figure 2). 
The current agricultural share of the workforce in Europe exceeds US levels of the past half 
century. Agriculture accounted for 6% of US workers in 1961 and less than 2% in 2004. In 
Europe, agriculture accounted for over one-quarter of workers in 1961, and some 8% today. In 
absolute terms, Europe’s agricultural labor force is 27 million workers, some ten times greater 
than the 3 million agricultural workers in the US. 
The Role of Agriculture in Trade 
When it comes to international trade, agriculture’s role in global merchandise trade has 
diminished over the last twenty-five years (Figure 3). This trend holds true for developed, 
developing and least-developed countries alike. However, while developed countries 
experienced a smooth decline in the significance of agricultural trade in total merchandise trade, 
the changes experienced by LDCs has been far less stable. For example, agricultural imports in 
the least-developed countries jumped from 6% of merchandise imports in 1994 to 14% in 1995, 
yet dropped sharply from 10% in 2004 to 4% in the next year (Figure 3b). The least-developed 
countries, and to a lesser extent developing countries, appear to be influenced by fluctuating 
circumstances in agricultural trade more than developed countries. 
 
 




















































































































































































































































DEVELOPED DEVELOPING LDC WORLD
 
Fig. 3(b) 
Figure 3: Agricultural Trade: (a) Ratio of Agricultural Exports to Total Merchandise 
Exports; (b) Ratio of Agricultural Imports to Total Merchandise Imports (Source: WTO 
2007a)  
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Over the past twenty-five years rich countries have been net importers and LDCs have 
been net exporters of agricultural commodities (Figure 4). As demonstrated in greater detail in 
Figure 5, LDCs were net exporters of agricultural products during the 1980s but became net 








































































































































Figure 4: Agricultural Net Exports by Value: Developed, Developing and Least Developed 
Countries, 1980-2005 (Source: WTO 2007a; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 2007) 
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Figure 5: Agricultural Position of Least Developed Countries, 1980-2005 (Source: WTO 
2007a; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 2007) 
 
3. Least-developed Countries and Agricultural Export Dependency 
An aspect that warrants attention is the degree of dependency on agriculture of the least-
developed countries. The Food and Agriculture Organization (2006) provides information on the 
share of agricultural commodities in total exports for 30 least-developed countries. As indicated 
in Figure 6, for these countries agriculture currently accounts for about 25 percent of total 
exports on average. Comoros, Ethiopia, Burundi, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Solomon Islands, 
Benin, Burkina Faso and Liberia depend on agriculture to a great extent, often for more than half 
their exports. Reliance on exports has declined in the last two decades for 22 least-developed 
countries, although Togo, Zambia, Guinea-Bissau, Solomon Islands, Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Liberia grew more dependent on agriculture for exports.  






































































































































































































































































































































Share of agriculture in total exports 1982/84 Share of agriculture in total exports 2002/04
 
Figure 6: Average Share of Agriculture in Total Exports of Least Developed Countries, 
during 1982-84 and 2002-04 (Source: FAO 2006)  
 
The FAO data shows furthermore that in several least-developed countries merely a few 
agricultural commodities account for a large share of agricultural exports. For instance, virtually 
all of Guinea-Bissau’s agricultural exports consist of its four top farm commodities. Finally, 
evidence presented by Aksoy and Beghin (2004, p.329), for example, indicates that least-
developed countries also rely largely on agriculture for economic growth and development. 
These poorest countries require access to global agricultural markets to exchange the farm goods 
(in which they have a comparative advantage) for capital goods and other inputs (such as 
fertilizer and pesticides) that can help drive economic development.  
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4. EU and US Agricultural Support Policies: A Comparison 
Agricultural Policy Overview 
Contemporary agricultural policies in the US date back to the 1930s. Agricultural 
programs in the US provide direct and indirect support through commodity policies and 
programs targeting food assistance, rural development and agri-environmental concerns (US 
Department of Agriculture 2007). Along with the expansion of US agricultural support programs 
beginning in the 1980s, there has been increasing concern about the negative impact that such 
programs have on the environment. Support programs generally encourage production, and thus 
increased use of chemicals and expansion onto marginal land. In response, US farm programs 
have included compliance requirements (e.g., performance of certain good agricultural practices 
in order to remain eligible for payments), legislation to prevent plowing of grassland 
(‘Sodbuster’ legislation) or draining of wetlands, incentives to idle land, and efforts to decouple 
producer support payments from production decisions. Since programs that pay farmers for non-
performance are generally eschewed by the public, US farm bills have vacillated back and forth 
on some of these issues. For example, in 2005, one-quarter of subsidy payments were 
independent of output decisions, but, rather than using decoupling to wean farmers off farm 
subsidies, Congress appears to be entrenching direct payments at the same time that it 
encourages production based subsidies (The Economist, 3 November 2007, p.37).  
Agriculture has also traditionally been a priority for economic leaders in Europe, 
particularly as a result of food shortages experienced during World War II. After the war, the 
leaders of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the 
European Economic Community in 1957 by signing The Treaty of Rome, which included a plan 
for a common agricultural policy (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2004). In July 1958, the Stresa 
Conference outlined the principles of the contemporary Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 
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1962, the CAP was implemented following its adoption by the six founding member states of the 
EU. Although modified in the intervening years, the CAP continues to be the cornerstone of EU 
agricultural policy, regulating the production, processing and trade of agricultural goods. At its 
inception the CAP had five objectives: (1) increasing agricultural productivity, (2) achieving fair 
living standards in the agricultural community, (3) stabilizing markets, (4) assuring availability 
of supply, and (5) ensuring reasonable consumer prices (Treaty Establishing the European 
Community [TEC], art. 33). To indicate the current importance of the CAP to the EU, in 2006 
the CAP accounted for about 45 percent of the EU budget (European Communities, 2006a). For 
a historical overview of the CAP, see Fouilleux (2006). 
Recent reforms to the CAP have emphasized decoupling of subsidy payments from 
production and greater reliance on international market forces. The former is addressed through 
the ‘single farm payment’ whereby producers are given a direct payment based on past 
production but decoupled from current or future production. However, the EU gives member 
states some flexibility in administering the program and adding to payments. As a result, some 
states have tended to favor coupled payments as this is more politically acceptable. Further, if 
farmers think that changes to the single farm payment might occur in the future and that these 
would be based on the most recent production levels at that time, the overall effect of decoupling 
might be weakened. At the same time, the EU has lowered support payments to move prices 
towards international levels, thereby reducing farm payments and/or the extent of export 
subsidies. 
Measuring Agricultural Support Levels 
It is important to have a common yardstick to gauge the level of support for agriculture in 
the two jurisdictions. One measure is the monetary value of transfers through different policy 
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instruments. This indicator is available from the World Trade Organization in the form of an 
Aggregate Measurement of Support. A variety of other measures have been developed by the 
OECD (2004; 2005), each of which uses a different approach to measuring agricultural support. 
The OECD measures include the Producer Support Estimate, Consumer Support Estimate, 
General Services Support Estimate, and Total Support Estimate. The OECD also computes a 
Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) and a Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC). 
The Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is a commonly accepted standard for quantifying 
agricultural support to farmers. The first component of the PSE consists of market price support. 
For each commodity market price support is calculated as the difference between the domestic 
producer price (the ‘farm-gate’ price) and the world market price multiplied by the volume of 
domestic production. The domestic-border price gap can arise due to price support for local 
producers, but also due to import tariffs and/or quotas. Thus, there is not necessarily an actual 
money transfer to the farmer in case of market price support. Direct budgetary transfers, the 
second component of the PSE, are subsidies to farmers based on factors such as the quantity of 
commodities produced or farmland area. “Foregone revenue” (for the policy makers), i.e. 
charging a input costs below what others pay for their inputs, also falls under the umbrella of 
direct budgetary transfers. Tax rebates for energy, water subsidies for irrigation, and loan 
guarantees are examples of foregone revenues. 
The Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) measures annual monetary transfers to consumers 
of agricultural goods. The base-line price to compute the CSE is the border price, which explains 
why the CSE is often negative (i.e. a consumer tax). For instance, when consumers pay the farm-
gate price (and this price exceeds the word market price), they essentially pay the costs of market 
price support. In partially offsetting such a consumer tax, governments provide consumer food 
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subsidies, for instance, in the form of less expensive food for low-income individuals. The 
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) represents annual monetary transfers to agriculture 
not targeted to individual farmers or consumers. An example is research and development 
funding in aid of the entire agricultural sector. The total monetary amount of aggregate transfers 
can be captured in the Total Support Estimate (TSE), i.e. the sum of the PSE, CSE and the 
GSSE, minus any receipts from import tariffs. Of the two coefficients computed by the OECD, 
the NPC is the ratio of producer to border prices, while the NAC represents the ratio of total farm 
receipts to farm receipts without support. 
We employ the PSE as our main measure of agricultural support. Producer support has 
the strongest potential to impact production incentives. As we will show in Section 5 these 
production incentives, in turn, affect production levels in the EU and the US and hence also 
LDCs through export levels and world market prices of agricultural commodities. As we will 
also see below, not all producer support is necessarily distortional. For example, market price 
support is a distortional type of support, whereas lump-sum transfers to farmers do not materially 
distort production decisions and hence have no impact on LDCs. However, detailed 
decompositions of the PSE data are available. PSE data can be analyzed at the country and 
commodity levels, over time and by PSE component. Other OECD measures lack this degree of 
detail.  
Producer Support Estimates: The EU and the US 
We compare agricultural support levels in the EU and the US in terms of absolute PSE, 
Percentage-PSE (the PSE as a percentage of the value of gross farm receipts; henceforth %PSE), 
and PSE at the commodity level. The %PSE facilitates comparison across goods, space and time, 
in contrast to the PSE which is in absolute monetary terms and thus dependent on the size of a 
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country’s agricultural sector and the inflation rate. Most recent PSE data indicate that aggregate 
OECD support to agriculture amounts to US$280 billion in 2005. As a percentage of the value of 
gross farm receipts, the %PSE is 31% in 2005, indicating that 69% of the gross income of an 
average farmer in the OECD came from the sale of products while 31% came from producer 
support, not an inconsequential proportion. 
Over the two decades between 1986 and 2005, the PSE in the EU has gradually increased 
to €108 billion. In the US, the PSE was $39 billion in 1986, declined to a low of $21 billion in 
1995, and peaked in 1999 at $56 billion. In 2005 the PSE in the US reached $43 billion. 
Averaged over 1986 to 2005, the %PSE in the EU was 36%, meaning agricultural producer 
support contributed 36%, and the sale of products 64%, of gross farm receipts (Figure 7a). Over 
the same twenty years, the US had an average %PSE of 18%, half the EU level, indicating that 
farmers derived 82% of receipts without any support (Figure 7b). 
Now turn to the PSE by commodity. In absolute terms, the EU spends more on 
agricultural support than the US for all commodities except maize (corn), oilseeds (primarily 
soybeans and canola), and eggs (Figure 8). In the EU, assuming no producer support for wool 
(data unavailable for the EU), most of the agricultural support budget was devoted to ‘other 
commodities’, followed by beef & veal, milk and wheat (Figures 8 and 9(a)). For the US, ‘other 
commodities’ also receives the largest share of agricultural support, followed by milk, maize and 
oilseeds (Figures 8 and 9(b)).  






































































































































































































































































Figure 7(b): %PSE in 2005, United States (Source: OECD 2005) 
















































































































































Figure 8: PSE by commodity in 2004, EU and US (Source: OECD 2005) 
 























































24% 7%  
Figure 9(b): PSE, commodity shares in 2004, US (Source: OECD 2005) 
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In the EU, beef & veal, refined sugar, and sheep meat are the top three agricultural 
commodities in terms of %PSE (Table 1). The %PSE of commodities has remained relatively 
constant over the period 1986-2004. In the US, refined sugar, milk and wheat receive the most 
producer support as a percentage of gross farm receipts, but during the period 1986-2004, wool, 
maize and rice were the top three commodities in terms of %PSE. Based on 2004 data, the role 
of agricultural support is higher in the EU than the US for the four most important grains: wheat, 
maize, rice and oilseeds. Producer support constitutes a higher percentage of total farm receipts 
in the EU than in the US for refined sugar, but the degree of producer support for milk is the 
highest in the US. The EU markets for beef & veal, pig meat, sheep meat and poultry rely much 
more heavily on transfers to producers than do their US counterparts. Agricultural support for 
eggs is modest and slightly higher in the US than in the EU.  
Table 1: Percentage-PSE by commodity, 2004 and 1986-2004 average, EU and US 
EU US EU US
2004 2004 Higher Avg Avg Higher
Wheat 39% 32% EU 46% 12% EU
Maize 43% 27% EU 44% 44% SAME
Rice 39% 18% EU 45% 37% EU
Oilseeds 35% 24% EU 51% 4% EU
Refined sugar 65% 56% EU 55% 37% EU
Milk 30% 39% US 50% 23% EU
Beef & veel 68% 4% EU 61% 5% EU
Pig meat 24% 4% EU 16% 7% EU
Sheep meat 52% 13% EU 62% 4% EU
Poultry 46% 4% EU 36% 34% EU
Eggs 2% 4% US 8% 9% US
Wool No info 24% N/A No info 51% N/A  
(Source: OECD 2005) 
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   It is clear that agricultural support plays a greater role in the EU than in the US as 
determined by the absolute magnitude of producer support, as well as percentage producer 
support, i.e. the proportion of farm receipts accounted for by agricultural support. US grains, 
oilseeds, and meat producers rely less on public support and more on markets than EU 
producers. The difference between the relative support levels for sugar, milk and eggs are 
relatively minor. The most important point is that, apart from EU and US eggs producers and US 
meat producers, producer support accounts for quite a significant proportion of agricultural 
producers’ income in both constituencies.  
5. The Impact of Agricultural Support Policies on Less Developed Countries 
To examine the impact on LDCs of agricultural support programs in developed countries, 
it is necessary to first consider the incentive effects of such programs on local farmers. These 
incentive effects depend on both the magnitude and the composition of producer support since 
some of its components are more distortional than others. In this section we look into 
decomposition of the PSEs for the EU and the US to assess their effect on LDCs.  
The Composition of Producer Support 
Market price support traditionally has and continues to account for a large share of the 
PSE in both the EU and the US. Market price support made up nearly half of the PSE in the EU 
in 2005, followed by “payments based on area planted or animal numbers”, which took up 
around a fifth (Figure 10a). The CAP underwent a substantial reform in 2003. We will discuss 
this reform later in the paper but like to point out here that it resulted in the rapid growth of 
“payments based on historical entitlements” in 2004 and 2005 (Figure 10a). Such payments are 
independent of production amounts or input use. In the US, market price support accounted for a 
fifth of the PSE, as did two other components referred to as “payments based on area planted” 
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and “payments based on input use” (Figure 10b). Observe that in the US “payments based on 
historical entitlements” were made since 1996.  




























































































































          A.  Market price support           B.  Payments based on output
          C.  Payments based on area planted/animal numbers           D.  Payments based on historical entitlements
          E.  Payments based on input use           F.  Payments based on input constraints
          G.  Payments based on overall farming income           H.  Miscellaneous payments
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Figure 10: Composition of the PSE: (a) EU25, (b) US (Source: OECD 2005) 
Market Price Support.  
Figure 10 has highlighted the importance of market price support on the PSE figures. The 
domestic production and welfare effects of market price support can be examined with the aid of 
Figure 11 which represents a typical agricultural commodity market of a developed country. 
Assume the equilibrium price and quantity would be given by PA and QA, respectively, in the 
absence of any trade (the autarky situation); and that under free trade the jurisdiction would be 
trading agricultural goods on international markets, so that the domestic price is identical to the 
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world price, Pworld< PA. Under free trade Qs
w would be domestic production, Qd
w domestic 
consumption, and the difference, Qd
w – Qs
w, imports. Market price support raises the farm-gate 
price above the world market price. In practice this is accomplished by either a support price for 
local producers, or by import tariffs or quota. Either way, if the farm-gate price of the 
agricultural commodity is supported at PSupport, farmers will increase production to Q′s but only 
the amount Qd
w will be consumed domestically, leaving a surplus of Q′s – Qd
w to be disposed of 
on international markets. Notice that the export subsidy required to dispose of the surplus is 

















































Figure 11: Rich Country Market: Impact of Market Price Support 
The overall burden to the public purse is given by area acgn. To reduce this burden, the 
government (whether the EU or US) could raise the domestic price to a level above the world 
market price, which would require the imposition of import duties or quota. (For some 
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commodities, import quotas are employed; this makes the analysis more complicated but does 
not change the general implications.). It is customary to raise the local price to PSupport,, however, 
this is strictly speaking not necessary, and to make this point clear, let us assume in Figure 11 
that the local price is raised to PA, By setting a higher price than the world market price in the 
domestic market, the surplus to be disposed of on international markets increases from Q′s – Qd
w 
to Q′s – QA, but the government saves an amount given by area metn. Since PA > Pworld, disposing 
the commodities on the international markets is now called dumping. The dumping subsidy 
amounts to area esgt, while area kcse constitutes an export subsidy. 
Now consider the welfare effects of market price support. From the perspective of free 
trade without government intervention, consumers in rich-country domestic markets are worse 
off, losing consumer surplus equal to mefn, of which mern is simply a transfer to producers. 
Rich-country producers gain a surplus amounting to acrn. The cost to government amounts to 
akem + kcgt. The overall welfare loss to the rich country is given by the triangles rcg plus eft, 
where rcg is the welfare loss from using a system of support prices, and eft from raising the 
domestic price above the international price through import duties. The deadweight loss rcg is 
the result of inefficient allocation of resources in the production of agricultural commodities – 
the extra cost of producing goods domestically that could be produced cheaper offshore. The 
deadweight loss eft represents the loss to consumers from higher prices that is not also 
transferred to producers (as is area etr). Observe that the deadweight loss eft would be “small” if 
the elasticity of demand for the commodity would be “small” (the demand curve is “steep”). This 
situation applies if consumers have no readily available substitutes for the commodity, a 
condition that applies for various agricultural commodities, but not all. 
The damage of market price support is not confined to developed countries, especially if 
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market price support is complemented by raising the local price, as is almost always the case in 
the EU and the US who operate the policy through import tariffs. As the country in Figure 11, 
the EU and the US would be importers of agricultural commodities without market price support, 
however currently they are exporters. This means that, first, LDCs lose the surplus associated 
with the loss of market access – the producer surplus plus differential rents associated with the 




2 In fact, agricultural output in LDCs is now (partially) squeezed out by exports of rich 
countries. In addition, because the rich jurisdiction has gone from being a net importer to a net 
exporter and now ‘dumps’ Q′s – QA onto the international market, the world market price for the 
commodity falls (though we do not make this explicit in Figure 11). The upshot of these losses in 
surplus is that investment by LDCs in agriculture is reduced so that the agricultural sector does 
not offer the same ability to drive economic development.   
Consider first a “type I” LDC that exported an agricultural commodity before a major expansion 
of agricultural support programs in rich countries, but became a net importer of that commodity 
thereafter. The situation is illustrated with the aid of Figure 12(a). The world price drops from 
Pworld to P
N
world and this causes the country to become a net importer as indicated. It is easy to 
demonstrate that consumers gain surplus given by areas B+E+G, while producers lose surplus 
given by areas B+E+F. A comparison of consumer gains and producer losses indicates that the 
overall loss (or gain) is determined by area F–G. The extent to which F exceeds G determines 
how much the LDC will lose. Clearly, under the circumstance where G>F, the LDC will actually 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the difference between producer surplus (also known as quasi-rent) and differential 
(or Ricardian) rent, see van Kooten and Folmer van Kooten, G. Cornelis and Henk Folmer, Land and 
Forest Economics, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004). While quasi-rents accrue to human 
investments, differential rents constitute a pure surplus that can be used as a driver of economic 
development. This is not to suggest that producer surplus is not an economic driver; it is just not as potent 
as a resource rent, such as a differential rent.  
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benefit from the expansion of rich countries’ support programs because the benefit to their 
consumers outweighs the loss to their producers. This hinges on the elasticities of demand and 
supply, which vary from one country to the next. 
Now consider a “type II” LDC where the world price remains above the no trade price after farm 
support programs in rich countries. This situation is illustrated in Figure 12(b). Again type II 
country producers will lose and consumers will gain. Consumers gain area α+β, but producers 
lose area α+β+γ, with the country losing γ overall, as α+β constitutes a loss to producers that 
benefits consumers. 
Direct Producer Subsidies 
Producer subsidies form the remainder of the PSE. In as far as these subsidies are based 
on farm production, input, or income, they are distortional. In Figure 10 we encounter these 
distortional subsidies in the categories “Payments based on output”, “Payments based on area 
planted/animal numbers”, “Payments based on input use” and “Payments based on overall 
farming income”, but we shall henceforth denote them by “production-based subsidies”. 
Production-based subsidies form a sizable share of producer support in the EU and the US. 
 

























































































Fig. 12(b): Type II Country 
Figure 12: Welfare Impact of Rich Countries’ Support Programs on LDCs 




























Figure 13: Rich Country Market: Production-based Producer Subsidies 
 
Figure 13 clarifies what is the domestic impact of a production-based subsidy. As in 
Figure 11 we have assumed again that, under free trade, and no agricultural support payments, 
the rich constituency would be importing agricultural commodities, i.e. Qd
w – Qs
w in the figure. 
A production-based subsidy shifts the supply curve out and boosts output to Q′s. Since only the 
amount Qd
w is consumed domestically the production subsidy turns the deficit Qd
w – Qs
w into a 
surplus of Q′s – Qd
w. As before, this surplus is disposed on international markets, but in this case 
this is not to be called dumping – the internal price stays at the world market level – and no 
export subsidies are involved. In Figure 13 we assumed for simplicity there is no impact on the 
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world market price. In this case local consumers are unaffected and local producers benefit (their 
surplus increases by bcde). However, the government loses out by more than the producers win, 
namely it loses a surplus of abcd compared to the no subsidy case. 
The impact of a production-based subsidy program on LDCs is qualitatively the same as 
the impact of market price support, because the rich country reduces its trade deficit and may 
transform from an importer into an exporter. Thus, as explained above, LDCs lose the surplus 
associated with the loss of market access, and, additionally face the consequences of a fall in the 
world market price for the commodity (see Figure 12 and its corresponding discussion). 
Figure 10 reveals there are also direct producer subsidies which do not depend on current 
production levels, namely “payments based on historical entitlements”, or depend negatively on 
output, namely “payments based on input constraints”. In theory these support payments do not 
have an adverse effect on LDCs, or they may even have a beneficial effect. Indeed, the World 
Trade Organization, who also monitors agricultural support programs classifies almost all the 
payments that the OECD classifies as “payments based on input constraints” in the “green box”, 
i.e. permitted payments because they do not (much) distort trade flows. 
The Impact of Producer Support on Farmers in Less Developed Countries  
We will now use the analysis above to classify agricultural support in the EU and the US 
based on their effect on farmers in LDCs. We will go beyond the discussion above and look into 
the break-up of “payments based on output”, “payments based on area planted/ animal numbers”, 
and “payments based on input use” as well, because not all of the subsidies found under these 
headers would qualify as “production-based producer subsidies” as defined above (see also 
Figure 13). Specifically, we classify producer support in the EU and the US as being “most 
harmful”, “somewhat harmful” or “not harmful” to farmers in LDCs. This classification 
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corresponds by and large to the classification of the WTO of agricultural support payments into 
the “amber box”, “blue box” and “green box”, respectively. However, our classification differs at 
times and includes just PSE figures, and not those for the General Services Support Estimate 
(GSSE), some of which payments are included in WTO figures. We draw on OECD data for 
2005. The most recent WTO data on the boxes would have been for the marketing year 2003-04. 
Table 2 reports our results. In 2005 about a half of the producer support of both the EU 
and the US inflicted substantial harm to Farmers in LDCs. The US was a little worse than the EU 
in this respect, however the percentage of “somewhat harmful” support measures in the US was 
lower than in the EU. Thus, per euro (dollar) spent the producer support measures of the EU and 
the US were roughly equally harmful to LDCs. In 2005 the (negative) footprint of the EU 
agricultural policy was larger than that of the US agricultural policy, but this was purely because 
of the larger amount of producer support in the EU and not because of its composition.  
Table 2: Impact on Farmers in LDCs of EU and US producer support in 2005 
  2005 Producer Support Estimate (EU)  2005 Producer Support Estimate (US) 
  PSE amount 
(mln Euros) 
Percentage of total  PSE amount 
(mln USD) 
Percentage of total 
Most harmful
a          50,703    47        23,361   55 
Somewhat harmful
b  33,306   31  10,675   25 
Not harmful
c  23,634   22    8,633   20 
Total             107,644  100  42,669  100 
Source: calculations by authors based on OECD (2005);  
a Market price support + Payments based on unlimited output + Payments based on unlimited 
area or animal numbers + Payments based on use of variable inputs + Payments based on overall 
farming income + Miscellaneous payments;  
b Payments based on limited output + Payments based on limited area or animal numbers + 
Payments based on use of on-farm services + Payments based on use of fixed inputs;  
c Payments based on historical entitlements + Payments based input constraints. 
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Beyond a Static Welfare Analysis of Producer Support 
Agricultural support programs in rich countries also have adverse implications on LDCs that 
cannot be studied using Figure 12. First, the decrease in the surplus flow to the agricultural 
sectors of LDCs will generally mean lower (re)investment levels in agriculture since local capital 
markets are usually far from efficient. If investments in agriculture are in the interest of the 
country this hampers economic development. Secondly, and relatedly, displaced farmers in 
LDCs are ‘freed up’ to work in other sectors. However, transition costs are sometimes unusually 
high. Many of these displaced agricultural workers are skilled in little else and may be illiterate. 
They are in urgent need of finding alternative employment and many consider leaving rural 
villages to seek jobs in urban centers. The arrival of transient laborers in cities adds to strains on 
urban infrastructure, giving rise to shanty towns and exacerbating other negative externalities. 
Not all surplus workers find work in the city and others face a vicious cycle of depression. 
Governments in LDCs face real challenges in absorbing such displaced agricultural workers who 
face barriers in acquiring further human capital.  
Beyond Producer Support 
So far we have focused on producer support (PSE data). We have seen that producer support in 
the EU is substantially higher than in the US. However, comparing EU and US support programs 
purely in terms of producer support remains contentious, especially seen that consumer support 
(CSE data) and general services support (GSSE data) in these constituencies show substantial 
differences as well. For instance, the 2005 CSE of the EU came down to minus €42 billion, i.e. 
an implicit consumer tax that shows that EU consumers paid for more than a third of the cost of 
producer support in the EU-25 in that year (€108 billion). By contrast, the 2005 CSE for the US 
was plus $21 billion. While consumer support clearly does not directly impact the incentives of 
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local producers, there may be an indirect effect through higher prices. We have neglected the 
CSE because we estimate the effect of consumer subsidies on aggregate demand for agricultural 
commodities is marginal. Prices may matter substantially for the demand of individual 
agricultural commodities, but a lot less for aggregate demand. It is clear, however, that the effect 
of consumer subsidies on LDCs must run in the opposite direction of the effects of market price 
support and production-based producer subsidies. 
Assessing the impact of general services support is potentially even more difficult 
because it is unclear to what extent such expenditures affects production incentives of local 
farmers. GSSE data include expenses on marketing and promotion, R&D support, as well as 
cheap crop insurance programs, which should all benefit producers. Thus, the effect of general 
services support on LDCs runs in the same direction as the effects of market price support and 
production-based producer subsidies, but it unclear what is the size of the effect. The GSSE of 
the EU-25 in 2005 came down to €10 billion, while that of the US was $36 billion. Wrapping up 
this discussion, we can conclude that in terms of general services support the US agricultural 
policy inflicted more harm on farmers in LDCs than the CAP of the EU, but that it is difficult to 
assess to what extent. 
6. Moving Forward with Agricultural Reform 
The previous section has made clear that protectionist agricultural support schemes in the US and 
the EU imply higher consumer prices in rich countries, continuation of inefficient production 
processes in rich countries, impediments to trade flows from LDCs, hindrance to improvements 
to the structure of the agriculture sectors of LDCs, and negative externalities in LDCs. Though 
farmers and exporters in LDCs are harmed, it is not always true that the LDC is worse off. As 
indicated in Figure 12, this depends on its unique situation (e.g., its supply and demand 
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elasticities). Ultimately, therefore, the impact of rich countries’ agricultural policies on LDCs is 
an empirical question. In this section we first review the existing evidence regarding this matter. 
After this we discuss the recent 2003 CAP reform in the EU because its implications stretch well 
beyond the year 2005. This means that the data on which our results in previous section were 
based may reflect a dated EU agricultural support policy. 
Liberalizing Agricultural Trade: Potential Benefits 
“Agricultural trade policies remain by far the most costly of all market distortions in 
world trade” (Anderson 2003, p. 146). Various studies have examined the potential welfare gains 
from reforming agricultural policies. The World Bank (2002) estimated the gains to total some 
$248 billion, which exceeds estimates for liberalizing trade in manufactured products. According 
to Anderson et al. (2000), reform of agri-food policies in rich countries alone would bring about 
approximately half of global welfare gains from the elimination of all trade distortions. Brandão 
and Martin (1993) examined the impact of agricultural reforms on prices, production and 
welfare, and estimated that the annual gain to LDCs from global trade liberalization would be 
$60 billion. A more recent study by Brockmeier, Klepper, and Pelikan (2007) estimated the 
global welfare gains from EU agricultural reforms alone to be $70 billion (although exclusion of 
sensitive products would reduce gains to $50 billion). 
Global trade volume is projected to expand by some 50% once developed countries lift 
their protectionist measures (Anderson 2004, 130-59). World prices of reformed agricultural 
commodities are generally expected to rise (OECD 2007), with Anderson (2004, 130-59) 
estimating a 5% overall increase in prices while Beghin et al. (2003, 39-58) estimate the increase 
to be 7%. Beghin and Aksoy (2003) provide estimates of expected price increases from 
liberalization for select agricultural commodities: 0-20% for cotton, 15-20% for groundnut, 20-
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40% for sugar and dairy goods, and 90% for rice.  
The impact of trade liberalization on individual LDCs can be expected to vary. As we 
have seen earlier, LDCs are hardly a homogenous group. Benefits that would likely arise for 
many LDCs include increased agricultural exports to rich countries. Some net food importers 
would be adversely affected by potential price increases, and may find it beneficial to re-orient 
toward exports. In addition, liberalization may have an adverse effect on income inequality in 
some LCDs. In general, however, the standard of living in LDCs can be expected to rise (Beghin, 
Ronald-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe 2003, 39-58). 
Dercon (1993, 157-194) illustrates the effect of stifling tariffs on exports originating from 
LDCs by estimating that cotton exports from Tanzania would have been 50% higher in the 
absence of export tariffs. In general, while agricultural exports by LDCs have grown in recent 
years, as shown in Figure 4, a clear dualism is emerging. From 1980 to 2001, the share of LDC 
exports of agricultural goods to other LDCs rose from 10% to 13%, but the share of their 
agricultural exports destined to developed countries declined from 26% to 23%. This pattern is 
not general to all merchandise trade as the share of LDC exports to rich countries of all 
manufactured goods jumped from 13% to 21% over the same period (Das 2005). Therefore, the 
data supports the notion that agricultural trade flows between LDCs and developed ones are 
restricted. 
Work from a series of case studies conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(2002) also found that, while LDCs are increasingly seeking broader access to global markets in 
agricultural goods, they are hampered by substantial barriers in capturing gains from trade. One 
study concluded that Egypt intended to use its comparative advantage and focus on producing 
horticultural crops of high value once they had more access to the global market. However, since 




the EU is the top destination for Egyptian agricultural goods, EU restrictions deter Egypt from 
making structural improvements in agriculture. 
Finally, Table 3, which is borrowed from Brockmeier et al. (2007), gives an indication of 
what might happen if most of the current trade distorting elements of agricultural support 
programs are removed. Specifically, they study what would be the impact of the Falconer 
proposal of July 2007 which aims to break the deadlock in the Doha round of the WTO 
negotiations (WTO, 2007b). While their results support the notion that trade in agricultural 
commodities will increase significantly, they also indicate that some of the shibboleths that are 
generally held to be true may not stand up to further scrutiny. First, while it is hardly unexpected 
that rich countries would import more agricultural commodities, it is perhaps surprising that each 
of them (including those with supposed inefficient agricultural sectors) will export substantially 
more as well, especially to LDCs. Second, the LDCs that are expected to see the greatest export 
growth are China and India, but these are also the countries that will experience the greatest 
increase in imports of agricultural commodities. Third, the least-developed countries in the WTO 
appear to benefit remarkably little from reforms. It is less surprising that countries outside the 
WTO (ROW) generally do not benefit much either.      
Table 3: Changes in Agricultural Trade Volume by Region (%)
a 
       Importer   
Exporter EU27 US  Canada  Japan Aus+NZ
b WTO IC





EU27  0.0  2.5 5.7 6.5 6.3 0.7 12.1  14.3 8.0 5.0 7.3 4.8 1.4
US  3.2  0.0  -0.1 9.0 3.9 28.2 12.2  9.7  10.0 4.7 3.4 4.8 1.6
Canada  3.3  0.0 0.0  17.1 5.1 5.0 13.8  9.4 7.1 6.5 3.9 5.8 3.7
Japan  5.9  -0.3 5.6 0.0 12.5 5.0 27.4  11.0 8.3 5.4 7.4 5.8 1.1
Aus+NZ
b 4.9  2.4  34.4  12.1 1.3 5.1 9.5  58.0  6.9 7.3 1.7 3.9 -1.3
WTO  IC  3.2  4.0 6.8 6.4 5.9 9.1 9.5  8.8 7.2 6.2 8.5 6.4 5.3
China  10.7  15.2 15.6 20.9 22.9 1.1 0.0  35.2 16.1 15.1 14.9 3.2 1.4
India  30.8  34.0 30.2 18.2 18.0 4.3 34.2 0.0 16.3 33.4 28.5 17.5 15.8
Brazil  32.6  5.0 5.8 0.9 6.3 6.2 6.8  -0.1 0.0 3.6 18.1 0.7 -5.4
ACP  5.6  6.1 0.9 2.9 11.9 -1.3 2.4  33.4 4.6 1.9 4.0 0.2 -0.7
WTO  DC 4.1  3.4 6.0 4.3 6.1 12.6 17.6  14.5 9.5 6.9 5.8 4.9 1.9
LDC  -2.7  -1.8 1.6 2.0 5.8 6.7 6.3  3.2 6.8 7.9 8.2 2.1 1.5
ROW  1.0  0.0 4.4 3.0 4.0 0.9 -2.9  -2.5 4.8 4.5 -1.9 5.7 1.8
a In 2014 and according to the Falconer proposal, i.e. excluding sensitive products (benchmark is current policy situation including 
2003 CAP reform, but excluding 2005 Farm Bill); 
b Australia and New Zealand; 
c Other industrialized WTO members: Switzerland, 
rest of EFTA, Albania, and Croatia; 
d Rest of Oceania and Caribbean, Botswana, South-Africa; 
e Other WTO members (developing 
countries); 
f Least-developed countries; 
g Rest of the World (Non WTO)  
Source: (Brockmeier, Klepper, and Pelikan 2007)
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Agricultural Reforms 
Reform of existing agricultural policies is an important public policy issue and a 
normative stance is required if concrete policy is to be implemented. Given the costs of 
agricultural support programs, on what grounds can subsidization of agriculture be justified? One 
commonly advanced argument draws on the public good argument that domestic support of 
agriculture generates aesthetic views that society desires. However, government can support such 
environmental and other public good amenities through other means including conditional lump-
sum transfers to farmers. 
The other defense for agricultural protection is income support, especially those of low-
income farmers. Although this degree of income support is not found in other sectors of the 
economy, farmers may simply have more political clout that causes income to be transferred in 
their direction, or society might feel that the farm lifestyle needs protection. Regardless, there are 
ways of transferring income to farmers without at the same time providing incentives to over 
produce, such as, again, lump sum transfers to farmers. These and other subsidy payments which 
are decoupled from output avoid over-production and also negative externalities associated with 
production-based payments, such as increased chemical use and loss of wetlands (see van 
Kooten, G. Cornelis and Folmer 2004, 533, pp. 376-324.).  
The recent 2003 CAP reform forms an example of a change in the right direction in this 
context. The reform meant a change towards an agricultural policy with greater attention to the 
environment and rural development, while curbing the magnitude of distortional measures at the 
same time. The Single Farm Payment, a subsidy decoupled from agricultural production levels 
(or input use) was introduced. EU member states also agreed to lower the expenses for direct 
producer support by 3 percent of the CAP budget annually and earmark the funds freed up for 
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“rural development” – this was termed “modulation” (EC 1782/2003). Decoupling has 
traditionally been a more important feature of the US agriculture policy than in the EU. 
However, the 2005 US Farm Bill backed away from direct support, revisited the use of historical 
yields and backed away from decoupled programs because of the political infeasibility of 
providing payments to farmers without receiving something in return.  
Because of the magnitude of producer support in the EU and the fact that the 2003 CAP 
reform has potentially substantial implications beyond 2005, the last year in the OECD dataset, 
we next analyse the likely implications of the CAP reform in terms of its consequences for 
LDCs. The 2003 CAP reform can be found back in the OECD data in 2005 in terms of its 
implied decrease in market price support (€57.5 billion in 2004 and €47 billion in 2005), as well 
as the steep increase in “payments based on historical entitlements” (i.e. the Single Farm 
Payment, €2 billion in 2004 and €17 billion in 2005). 
What do we know about the impact of the 2003 CAP reform in the years following 2005? 
Our reference year will be 2013 as the EU’s budget for agriculture and rural development has 
been fixed until then and European Communities (2007) provides expected production levels of 
agricultural commodities for it. We first address the anticipated change in market price support 
in the EU. OECD (2005) bases the 2005 market price support of €47 billion on a computed 
amount of €34.2 billion for 23 ‘standard commodities’. Of the €34.2 billion an amount of €27.5 
billion stems from animal products, notably milk (€9.0 billion), beef (€8.7 billion), pigmeat (€4.3 
billion), and poultry (€4.6 billion). However, the milk sector underwent a reform that will 
gradually reduce the farm-gate price. Based on EC 1788/2003 (milk reform) and production 
estimates in European Communities (2007) we have estimated the amount of market price 
support in the milk sector will reduce to €5.7 billion in 2013. Furthermore, based on the recent 
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cereal price increases, we anticipate that market price support in cereals will disappear 
completely in 2013 (was €4.0 billion in 2005). The sugar sector has also been reformed recently 
(EC 318/2006) and we anticipate this will lower market price support from €2.7 billion in 2005 
to €0.8 billion in 2013. Absent any announcement of reforms we anticipate market price support 
in oil seeds (was €0), potatoes (was €0.60 billion), plants and flowers (was €0.44 billion), and 
tomatoes (was €0.49 billion) will grow with inflation (2 percent annually). Finally, there are no 
pending reforms of the beef, pig meat, poultry of sheep meat sectors, and meat prices have not 
changed drastically since 2005. Based on market price differentials that are assumed to grow 
with inflation and the production estimates in European Communities (2007), we have estimated 
market price support in beef, pig meat, poultry, and sheep meat will grow to €10.0  billion, €5.6  
billion, €6.3  billion, and €1.1  billion, respectively, in 2013. Adding everything up we estimate 
market price support in 2013 to be €41.0 billion, or €35.0 billion in 2005 prices. 
Now turn to direct support to farmers (i.e. expenditures under the EAGF) and rural 
development (i.e. EAFRD). The budget of DG Agriculture and Rural Development has been 
fixed to €51 billion (in 2004 prices) in the recent inter-institutional agreement. EC 410/2006 
makes clear that in 2013 €39 billion of this amount will be spend on direct support, and €12 
billion on rural development. Finally, based on member states’ announced intentions, European 
Communities (2007) estimates that 91 percent of the direct support payments in 2013 are 
decoupled from production. 
Where does this leave us in terms of the anticipated impact of the CAP on LDCs in 2013? 
Table 4 contrasts the impact of producer support in the EU in 2005 and 2013. As in Table 2 the 
PSE is classified into “most harmful”, “somewhat harmful” or “not harmful” to farmers in LDCs. 
Table 4 makes clear that the 2003 CAP reform is a substantial step towards a less distortional 
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agricultural policy. EU producer support is expected to diminish by about 20 percent to €87.4 
billion in 2013 (2005 prices), and our calculations also lead us to anticipate improvements in 
terms of the composition of the PSE. We expect a slightly lower percentage of producer support 
which is “most harmful” to farmers in LDCs in 2013 (i.e. market price support, or ‘coupled’ 
direct payments), and a substantially higher percentage of producer support which is “not 
harmful” to farmers in LDCs. In conclusion, it is clear that the 203 reform has been an important 
step in the right direction. However, the CAP will still have a substantial negative impact on 
LDCs in 2013 without any further reforms. The most substantial reduction of harmful support 
would be achievable by reducing market price support in the meat sectors. 
Table 4: Analysis of the recent CAP reform in terms of consequences for LDCs 
  EU PSE in 2005  Estimated EU PSE in 2013 
  PSE amount 
(mln 2005 Euros) 





a          50,703      47    38,617   44 
Somewhat harmful
b  33,306  31          0    0 
Not harmful
c  23,634 22  48,753    56 
Total             107,644             100  87,370  100 
Sources: authors calculations based on OECD (2005), EC 318/2006 (reform sugar sector), EC 
410/2006 (modulation), and European Communities (2006b, 2007)  
a 2005 data from OECD (2005): Market price support + Payments based on unlimited output + 
Payments based on unlimited area or animal numbers + Payments based on use of variable inputs 
+ Payments based on overall farming income + Miscellaneous payments; 2013 data: Estimated 
2013 market price support + estimated “coupled” direct EAGF payments (9 percent of estimated 
2013 EAGF budget of €39,977 million).  
b 2005 data from OECD (2005): Payments based on limited output + Payments based on limited 
area or animal numbers + Payments based on use of on-farm services + Payments based on use 
of fixed inputs; 2013 data: estimated zero, though a small fraction of support classified as “not 
harmful” may affect production levels of EU producers. 
c 2005 data from OECD (2005): Payments based on historical entitlements + Payments based 
input constraints; 2013 data: Estimated 2013 EAFRD budget of €12,374 million + estimated 
decoupled direct EAGF payments. 
d Based on annual inflation rate of 2 percent, as in EC 410/2006. 
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7. Conclusions 
Rich countries are committed to alleviating poverty in LDCs through pledges to boost 
foreign aid. While one could hardly object to foreign aid, developed countries simultaneously 
hamper economic development in LDCs through their agricultural support programs. Farmers 
many LDCs depend importantly on growing crops and tending livestock to make a living and 
LDCs rely heavily on exports of agricultural commodities for economic growth.  
Among rich countries, the EU and the US are heavy-weights in providing substantial 
support to the domestic agricultural sector. A comprehensive comparison of support levels 
indicates that the level of agricultural support in the EU is much higher than in the US, but even 
a liberalization of agricultural policies in the US would have a noticeable positive impact on 
LDCs. The 2003 CAP reform in the EU will reduce producer support by 20 percent in the period 
2006-2013 and will also lead to a less harmful policy mix for LDCs. Yet, EU market price 
support remains at a high level for meat and this harms producers in LDCs significantly.  
Many countries other than those in the EU and the US provide varying levels of 
protection to agriculture, including Japan, Canada and Norway. What is surprising is the lack of 
progress in liberalizing agricultural programs given the enormous benefits it would imply to the 
citizens of the countries who would liberalize. One priority and challenge is to translate 
knowledge about the benefits of agricultural reform into action. For instance, it is important to 
get the basic message across that market price support is very costly to citizens, despite the fact 
that it is nearly budgetary neutral for governments of importing countries. A related and obvious 
challenge is to phase out the most distortional instruments, namely market price support or 
subsidies proportional to input use, output volume, or income of farms. Government could 
consider implementing more targeted policies directed at specific groups of producers, and, in 
case abolishing support altogether is not feasible, distortional measures could be exchanged for 
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direct producer payments based on historical yields, farm area, and the provision of certain 
environmental services (OECD 1994). A side benefit of such policies that involve direct 
payments to farmers is that they make it easy to inform citizens which producers receive support 
payments and thus highlight the re-distributive implications of the support payments (e.g. 
Fouilleux 2006). 
With multilateral trade negotiations, “it is an easier way out, which does not mean that it 
is easy” (Das 2005, p. 145). Breaking the deadlock in future rounds of WTO multilateral trade 
negotiations requires understanding that obstacles have historically hampered the path to 
agricultural policy reform. One such obstacle has been the power of lobby groups who support 
agricultural policies. We can expect resistance to trade liberalization to be higher in the EU than 
the US, because, as we have seen, agriculture is more important in the EU in terms of the size 
and fraction of the labor force engaged in primary agriculture. This translates into more voters, 
thus, there is more is at stake for politicians in the EU than the US. Another obstacle to CAP 
reform has traditionally been fierce opposition by the French. France has been, and continues to 
be, a very influential member of the European Union. 
We comprehend how difficult is the road ahead. But we know full well how greater the 
difficulty would be if we do not act. As the adage goes: “‘getting prices right’ is not the end of 
economic development, … but ‘getting prices wrong’ frequently is” (Timmer 1973, 57-76, p. 
76).  
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